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IH THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1..\ i\1.\H PEA Y, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
TilE PROVO CITY SCHOOL DIS-
TRICT, A BODY CORPORATE 
.\NO POLITIC, AND MERRILL 
CHRISTOPHERSON, RAY MUR-
DOCK, SHIRLEY PAXMAN, WIL-
FORD E. SMITH, AND LA MAR 
Ei\IPEY, MEMBERS OF SAID 
BOARD, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 
9722 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF 
AMICUS CURIAE 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Board of Education of Salt Lake City, the 
Board of Education of Ogden City, the Board of Edu-
cation of ~lurray City, and the Board of Education 
nf Granite School District, all public corporations, 
pursuant to orders of the court allowing said Boards 
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of Education to join as amicus curiae, respectfully 
petition the court for rehearing in the a hove entitled 1 
cause. Petitioners rely upon the following points\, 
as error in the decision of the court: 
PoiNT 1 
The term "electors" as used 1n Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) Section 53-7-24, as amended, re-' 
specting leeway elections, does not limit the indi-
viduals entitled to vote to those who have paid a 
property tax in the year next preceding such election. 
A. The term "elector" as used in Section 
53-7-24 defines the qualification of voters and' 
there is no uncertainty or ambiguity as to its 
meaning. The meaning of the word "electors'!. 
is not modified by reference to other statutory 
provisions which set forth the "manner" of 
holding elections or the "procedure" to be 
followed in conducting such elections. All 
"electors" may therefore vote. 
B. To construe the term "electors" as set 
forth in the leeway election statute to mean 
"tax paying electors" is a strained construction 
and would be in violation of our State Consti· 
tution. 
PoiNT 2 
In the event that this court should decide that thE 
term "electors," as set forth in Section 53-7-24, mearu 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
those electors who have paid a property tax in the 
year preceding the election, the election nevertheless 
may not be invalidated unless the plaintiff has shown 
that sufficient improper votes were cast to change 
thr n•sult of the election. 
PoiNT 3 
ThP forn1 of the notice of election and of the 
proposition voted upon were sufficient. 
Dated this 1st day of March, 1963. 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
PAUL B. CANNON 
STEPHEN A. WEST 
Attorneys for Board of Education of 
Salt Lake City 
SAMUEL C. POWELL 
Attorney for Board of Education of 
Ogden City 
RICHARD C. HOWE 
Attorney for Board of Education of 
Murray City 
McKAY AND BURTON 
DAVID L. McKAY 
Attorney for Board of Education of 
Granite School District 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
This court based its decision of December 3'1 
' 1962, on two points: First, that the voters at the 
leeway election should have been limited to those 
who had paid a property tax in the preceding year, 
and, second, that the notice was insufficient. Our 
position on these two matters is covered in Points 
1 and 3. Point 2 was not referred to in the court's 
opinion. Petitioners herein are other school districts 
which have held successful leeway elections. 
Whether or not this court reaches a different ultimate 
result with respect to the Provo School District elec-
tion, we request that this court reconsider its opinion 
with reference to each of the points set forth herein 
for the reason that the situation may be, and pre-
sumably is, different with respect to each of the 
school districts appearing in this petition. The lee-
way election held by each of such districts may be 
valid even though the election in the Provo District 
is still declared invalid by reason of only one matter 
\ 
covered by the three points stated. 
An early consideration of the petition for rehear-
ing and decision thereon is requested for the reason 
that school districts heretofore holding leeway elec-
tions may desire to resubmit the leeway question, or 
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may be confronted with the necessity of budgeting 
for the year 1963-64 without the benefit of the right 
to maintain a school program in excess of the cost 
otherwis~ allowed. By law, the tentative budget for 
t>arh school district must be submitted on or before 
June l, ( U .C.A. ( 1953), Sec. 53-20-1.) If another lee.,. 
way election is to be held prior to the preparation of 
the tentative budget, it is almost a necessity that 
th~r~ be a decision to do so by a board of education by 
April go, 1963. An earlier decision by this court on 
this petition for rehearing would be very helpful. 
\Ye call attention to these facts for information, 
with no intent to impose on the court. 
This being a Petition for Rehearing, it is not 
felt that the facts and the ruling of the trial court 
rrquire r~statement. 
Italics throughout this petition and brief are the 
petitioners, unless otherwise indicated. 
PoiNT 1 
THE TERM ··ELECTORS" AS USED IN 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), SECTION 
53-7-2+, AS AMENDED, RESPECTING LEE-
\Y.-\ Y ELECTIONS DOES NOT LIMIT THE 
YOTERS TO THOSE WHO HAVE PAID A 
PROPERTY TAX IN THE YEAR NEXT PRE-
CEDING SUCH ELECTION. 
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The following is a brief statement of this court's 
conclusion in its opinion of December 31, 1962 with 
respect to Point No. 1. Section 53-7-24, U.C.A. 
( 1953), as amended, provides that a school district 
may maintain a school program in excess of the costs 
of a program already authorized "with the consent of 
a majority of the electors of the district voting at an 
election or elections held for that purpose in the man-
ner set forth in section 53-2-12 (53-7-12) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 .... " The court then in accoJ:dance 
with the foregoing statute referred to section 53-7-12 
which in turn says that the board in holding that 
election "shall follow the procedure in elections for 
the issuance of bonds so far as applicable." This court 
then made reference to elections for the issuance of 
bonds, quoting particularly from Section 53-10-11 
with respect to "qualification of voters" and held that 
such section restricts the persons eligible to vote at a 
leeway election to those who have paid a property tax 
in the year next preceding such election. Upon this 
proposition it held that since the voters had not been 
restricted to "tax paying electors" the election was 
invalid. 
PoiNT 1. A 
THE TERM "ELECTOR" AS USED IN SEC-
TION 53-7-24 DEFINES THE QUALIFICA-
TION OF VOTERS AND THERE IS NO UN-
CERTAINTY OR AMBIGUITY AS TO ITS 
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MEANING. THE MEANING OF THE WORD 
"ELECTORS" IS NOT MODIFIED BY REFER-
ENCE TO OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
WHICH SET FORTH THE "MANNER" OF 
HOLDING ELECTIONS OR THE "PRO-
CEDURE" TO BE FOLLOWED IN CONDUCT-
ING SUCH ELECTIONS. ALL "ELECTORS" 
MAY THEREFORE VOTE. 
Section 53-7-24, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, so 
far as it refers to electors who can vote provides: 
"With the consent of a majority of the 
electors of the district voting at an election 
or elections held for that purpose in the man-
ner set forth in section 53-2-12 (53-7-12), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, any district may main-
tain a school program in excess of the cost of 
the program referred to in sections 53-7-22 
and 53-7-23 above." 
In addition to the foregoing language from the 
first paragraph, there is the following language from 
thf' second paragraph of Section 53-7-24: 
"Consideration of such additional program 
and of modification, increases or decreases 
thereof by such elections may be initiated by 
a petition signed by electors of the district 
equal to 10% of the number of electors who 
voted at a preceding election on said question 
or by action of the board of education." 
It i~ reasona bl(' to presume that the word 
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"electors" has the same meaning in both of the above 
quoted sentences from Section 53-7-24. The second 
sentence is by no possibility tied to any other election 
statutes for a definition of electors. The sentence 
has to do with a percentage of the number of electors. 
They certainly do not have to be "tax paying 
electors." 
Furthermore, the term "electors" must include 
all registered voters unless it is specifically provided 
that the electors shall be restricted. Some statutory 
and constitutional provisions should be helpful on 
this matter. Chapter 2 of Title 20, U.C.A. (1953), 
is a complete procedure for determining what is 
necessary for registration and thus to qualify a per-
son as an "elector." That chapter does not restrict 
the right to vote by any property qualification nor 
does it restrict it to those who have paid taxes. Section 
20-2-29, the final section of that chapter, states: 
"No person shall hereafter be permitted to 
vote at any general, special, municipal or 
school election, or at any primary election for 
the nomination of officers to be voted for at 
municipal elections in cities of the first and the 
second class, without having first been reg-
istered within the time and in the manner and 
form required by the provisions of this 
chapter.'' 
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.\n elector is one who has met all the qualifica-
tions as set forth in said Chapter 2 of Title 20. When 
thrsr requirements are met, the right to vote is 
Psta blish ed. 
This matter is further clarified by the Constitu-
tion of the State of Utah. See Article IV entitled 
"F.lrctions and Right of Suffrage.'' 
SPrtion l provides: 
'"The rights of citizens of the State of Utah 
to vote and hold office shall not be denied or 
abridged on account of sex. Both male and 
female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally 
all civil, political and religious rights and 
privileges." 
Section ~ provides: 
''Every citizen of the United States, of the 
age of twenty-one years and upwards, who 
shall have been a citizen for ninety days, and 
shall have resided in the State or Territory 
one year, in the county four months, and in 
the precinct sixty days next preceding any 
election, shall be entitled to vote at such elec-
tion except as herein otherwise provided." 
Sections 3 and 4 deal with immunity from arrest 
and inununity from militia duty on election day. 
Section 5 provides that "electors" shall be citizens of 
the United States and Section 6 disqualifies insane 
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persons and certain criminals. Section 7 of Articl(' 
IV then states: 
"Exceptin elections levying a special tax or 
creating indebtedness, no property qualifica-
tion shall be required for any person to vote 
or hold office.'' 
Assuming, without admitting, that Section 7 of 
Article IV of the Constitution permitted the legisla-
ture to restrict the votes in a leeway election to those 
who have paid a property tax in the preceding year, 
the legislature did not see fit to do so. (That said 
Section 7 does not permit the legislature to restrict 
votes in a leeway election will be discussed in sub-
heading B. of Point 1.) 
The following authorities indicate that where 
there is reference to the "manner" of holding an 
elction or the "procedure" for holding an election, 
there is no reference to the subject of the qualification 
of the voter. 
The case of People v. Guden, 75 N.Y.S. 347 
C 1902), dealt with a constitutional provision which 
read: 
" 'Justices of the peace and district court 
justices may be elected ... in such manner 
and with such powers and for such terms 
respectively as are or shall be prescribed by 
law; .... '" 
10 
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Th~ court said: 
"The 'manner of election' does not go to 
the question of what body of electors shall 
elect." 
ln the case of State vs. Zimmerman, 18 7 Wis. 180; 
204 N .W. 803 ( 1925), the question was whether the 
form of the ballot was intended to be included in the 
statutory words "that it shall be submitted in the 
1nanner provided by law." The court held that the 
word "manner" had nothing to do with the form of 
the ballot. Certainly if "manner" does not include 
the form of the ballot, it does not include the qualifi-
cation of voters. 
The court said: 
". . . the Legislature prescribes that the 
question to be voted upon shall be presented 
in accordance with the act or resolution direct-
ing its submission, etc. Chapter 289 of the 
Laws of 1923 does not prescribe the form of 
the submission, but provides that it shall be 
submitted in the manner provided by law, etc. 
The manner of the submission is ·set forth in 
detail in said subdivision 8. This raises an-
other question of construction, and involves 
the meaning of that portion of section 1 of 
article 12, in which the term 'manner' is used. 
In Littell v. State, 133 Ind. 580, 33 N.E. 418, 
it is said: ' "Manner" signifies "mode of action, 
way of performing or affecting anything, 
method~ style." ' 
11 
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"In Bankers' Life Ins. Co. v. Robins, 59 
Neb. 174, 80 N.W. 486, it is said: 'The manner 
of doing a thing has reference to the way 
of doing-to the method of procedure. * * *' 
"In People v. English, 139 Ill. 622, 29 N.E. 
678, 15 L.R.A. 133, the word 'manner' as used 
in section 5, art. 8 of the Illinois Constitution, 
indicates merely that the Legislature may pro-
vide by law the usual, ordinary, or necessary 
details required for the holding of the elec-
tion." 
The court later said: 
"Where a thing is required to be done in 
the manner prescribed by a certain section of 
an act, and if such section referred to includes 
the element of time and the element of form, 
then the term as used must be construed to 
mean both time and form. In legal parlance, 
in describing a certain procedure, the ex-
pression is often used, 'in manner and form, 
etc.', thus distinguishing and differentiating 
the two terms." 
In the case of Livesly v. Litchfield, 47 Ore. 248, 83 
Pac. 142 ( 1905), the State Constitution gave the leg-
islature the power to create municipal corporations 
by special laws and to prescribe by law the "manner" 
of the election or appointment of the officers thereof. 
The legislature created the City of Salem, Oregon, 
and included in its charter a provision prohibiting 
any person from voting at a Salem City election who 
12 
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had not paid or was not exernpt from the payment 
of a road poll tax for the year in which he should 
vote. The court held that when the Constitution gave 
the legislature the power to prescribe the "manner" 
of an election it did not give the legislature power 
to prescribe the eligibility of voters. 
The court said: 
"The authority given by section 7 of article 
6 to prescribe 'the time and manner' in which 
municipal officers may be elected or appointed 
does not, we think, include the power to deter-
mine what shall constitute a legal voter." 
The court then quoted from the case of Coffin v. 
Elec. Commissioners, 97 Mich. 188, 56 N.W. 567, 
~1 L.R.A. 662: 
"''The authority to direct the time and man-
ner in which judicial officers shall be elected, 
and the other officers elected or appointed, 
does not involve the power to determine who 
shall constitute the electorate. The word 'man-
ner,' it is true, is one of large signification, but 
it is clear that it cannot exceed the subject to 
which it belongs. It relates to the word 
'elected.' The Constitution had already pro-
vided for electors, and when it provides that 
an officer shall be elected it certainly contem-
plates an election by the electorate which it 
has constituted. No other election is known 
to the Constitution, and, when it provides that 
the Legislature may direct the manner in 
13 
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the Constitution providing that 'there may be 
a county superintendent of schools in each 
county, whose qualifications, powers, duties, 
compensation, and time and manner of elec-
tion, and term of office shall be prescribed by 
law' (Canst. art. 8, § 5), the court said that 
the word 'manner' as used in the constitutional 
provision 'indicates merely that the Legisla-
ture may provide by law, the usual, ordinary, 
or necessary details required for the holding 
of the election,' and not that it may deter-
mine the qualifications of voters. The term 
'manner of election' has been given the same 
interpretation by other courts. Board of Edu-
cation Commissioners v. Knight, 187 Ind. 108, 
117 N.E. 565, 650; Livesley v. Litchfield, 47 
Ore. 248, 83 Pac. 142, 114 Am. St. Rep. 920; 
People v. Guden, 75, N.Y. Supp. 347; State 
v. Adams, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 231." 
As can be seen from the foregoing, there is ample 
authority from many states that the use of the word 
"manner" in providing how an election shall be held 
does not refer to the qualification of voters. There is 
also the language of Section 53-7-12, which says that 
the school board "shall follow the procedure in elec-
tions for the issuance of bonds so far as applicable." 
"Procedure" even more clearly excludes the question 
of qualification of voters. In our search for authori-
ties on the meaning of these words there appears to 
be no case holding that "manner" of holding an elec-
tion includes the qualification of electors. 
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PoiNT 1. B 
TO CONSTRUE THE TERM "ELECTORS" 
AS SET FORTH IN THE LEEWAY ELEC-
TION STATUTE TO MEAN "TAX PAYING 
ELECTORS" IS A STRAINED CONSTRUC-
TION AND WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF 
OUR STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Appellant in his brief relied particularly upon 
Section 53-10-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953), a 
part of the chapter dealing with bond elections, 
which section very clearly restricts the voting to those 
registered voters who have paid a property tax within 
the district in the year next preceding such election. 
Appellant then quotes from Sections 1, 2, 5 and 16 
of Chapter 10, each of which sections specifically 
states that only such qualified electors as shall have 
paid a property tax shall be eligible to vote. The 
legislature, in providing for elections for the creation 
of an indebtedness, including the issuance of bonds, 
made it abundantly clear that the voters must be 
"tax paying electors." The emphasis placed upon the 
qualification of voters in an election creating an 
indebtedness is a clear indication that if the legisla-
ture had intended to limit the voting on a leeway 
election to "tax paying electors" it would have said 
so. The fact that there are "more than five references 
made to the requirement of property tax payments" 
17 
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1n the chapter on creating indebtedness, and that 
there is no such restriction in the leeway statute, is 
rather clear evidence that so much restriction was 
intended. 
This court took the view in its opinion of Decem-
ber 31, 1962, that the reference to "tax paying 
electors" in Chapter 10, Title 53, demonstrated a legis-
lative policy "in the closely analogous situations in-
volving the incurring of indebtedness by school dis-
tricts." It is true that an affirmative vote in a leeway 
election does increase the tax burden, but it does not 
incur indebtedness; and it does not follow that the 
legislature intended to or must limit the voters in 
a leeway election to tax paying electors. There are 
many ways in which taxes are increased or decreased 
without a vote limited to "tax paying" electors. The 
legislature which controls the limit of indebtedness 
or the limit of taxes by counties, cities, other munic-
ipalities, and school districts, is elected by all of the 
registered voters or electors, as are county com-
missions, city commissions, and school boards. Yet 
these bodies control the amount of taxes. 
As will appear from the reference to constitu-
tional provisions covering qualification of voters and 
the right to vote quoted under subheading A., (page 9 
and 10 of this brief), our Constitution has carefully 
guarded the right to vote. The legislature in Chapter 
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10 of Title 53 has carefully followed its prerogative to 
limit the electors to "tax paying" electors where an 
indebtedness will be incurred. No such clear intent 
can be found in the leeway election law, and we 
believe it to be a strained construction to apply the 
limitations on the right to vote, contained in Chapter 
10 of Title 53, to leeway elections. We, therefore, 
strongly urge, as a matter of statutory construction, 
that there was no intention on the part of the legisla-
ture to place any limitation on the right to vote under 
Section 53-7-24. 
Aside from the question of intent, it would be un-
constitutional for the legislature to limit the right 
to vote at a leeway election to "tax paying electors." 
Article IV, Section 7 of our State Constitution pro-
vides: 
"Except in elections levying a special tax 
or creating indebtedness, no property qualifi-
cation shall be required for any person to vote 
or hold office." 
See also Article I, Section 4 of our Constitution; the 
last sentence of which provides: 
"No property qualification shall be required 
of any person to vote, or hold office, except as 
provided in this Constitution.'' 
It is, of course, under the authority of these 
sections that the legislature had the authority in 
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Chapter 10, Title 53 to restrict the voting to those 
who had paid a property tax. The entire Chapter 
1 O, by its heading, has only to do with "creating 
indebtedness." Since the leeway election does not 
create an indebtedness, the authority to restrict the 
voters is not based on the same reason or policy. 
Then, it must be asked, is a leeway election an 
election "levying a special tax." Clearly it is not. 
A special tax is one levied for the purpose of benefit-
ing property or special property. Taxes which are 
levied for carrying out the functions of the state are 
all general taxes. We refer to the case of Madsen v. 
Bonneville lrr. Dist., 65 Utah 571, 239 Pac. 781 
( 1925) for the definition of a special tax. The tax 
involved in that case was a tax for the support of 
an irrigation district. The distinction between a 
general and a special tax is clearly set forth in head-
note 6 of the case, as follows: 
"MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 405-'SPE-
CIAL TAX' DISTINGUISHED FROM 'GEN-
ERAL TAX.' A 'general tax' is considered a 
contribution for support of state, whereas a 
'special tax' or local assessment is considered 
as compensation for special benefits to party 
paying." 
That this is the general rule see 51 Am. Jur., Taxa-
tion, Sec. 27, p. 54 
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"As General or SpeciaL-Taxes, particular-
ly property taxes, are occasionally classified as 
general or special. This classification is made 
most commonly with respect to the distinction 
between the imposition known as a 'special 
assessment' and the customary annual tax 
imposed upon all property within the taxing 
district to provide revenue for the usual and 
ordinary day-to-day expenses of the govern-
ment, the term 'special tax' sometimes being 
used as synonymous with the term 'special 
assessment.' With respect to general taxes, the 
government renders no return of special bene-
fit to any property, but only secures to the 
citizen the general benefit which results from 
protection to his person and property and the 
promotion of various schemes which have for 
their object the welfare of all; on the other 
hand, special assessments or special taxes 
proceed upon the theory that when a local im-
provement enhances the value of neighboring 
property that property should pay for the 
improvement." 
We submit, therefore, that our legislature has 
carefully followed the Constitution by limiting voters 
under Chapter 10 of Title 53 to tax paying electors 
because that is an election creating an indebtedness. 
It carefully did not limit the voters in a leeway 
election because it is not an election creating an 
indebtedness or levying a "special tax." For this 
court to interpret electors to mean property taxpay-
ing electors would be to put an interpretation on the 
statute that would put it in conflict with the constitu-
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tion. This court has said, "It is elementary doctrine 
universally applied in this country that, if an act is 
open to two interpretations or constructions, one of 
which creates a conflict with some constitutional 
provision, while the other makes the act harmonious 
with the constitution, it is the duty of the courts to 
adopt the latter interpretation and construction." 
Leatham v.Reger, 54 Utah 491, 182 Pac. 187 (1919), 
see also The Best Foods v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 
285 Pac. 1001 (1930), Garfield Smelting Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission of Utah, 53 Utah 133, 178 Pac. 57 
(1918) 
Furthermore, the leeway election does not itself 
levy a tax, but only permits the board of education 
to maintain a certain school program in excess of a 
cost otherwise provided by statute. The election is 
not actually an election levying a tax. If the election 
carries, it is only permissive and the board of educa-
tion then elects whether or not to increase the budget. 
In any event, the resulting tax is a general tax, not 
a special tax and no property qualification may be 
imposed. 
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PoiNT 2 
IN THE EVENT THAT THIS COURT 
SHOULD DECIDE THAT THE TERM "ELEC-
TORS," AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 53-7-24, 
MEANS THOSE ELECTORS WHO HAVE 
PAID A PROPERTY TAX IN THE YEAR PRE-
CEDING THE ELECTION, THE ELECTION 
MAY NEVERTHELESS NOT BE INV ALI-
DA TED UNLESS THE PLAINTIFF HAS 
SHOWN THAT SUFFICIENT IMPROPER 
VOTES WERE CAST TO CHANGE THE 
RESULT OF THE ELECTION. 
Point No. 2 is academic in this case should the 
court agree with our position on Point No. 1 that all 
registered voters may vote at a leeway election. 
While we sincerely believe such to be the law, we 
further believe that in the event that the court does 
not deem this to be the law, the mere fact that in-
structions were given that all electors might vote is 
insufficient to invalidate an election. We rely both 
upon our statute with respect to this matter an_d the 
general common law. Section 20-15-1 Utah Code 
Annotated ( 1953), provides: 
"The election ... to determine any. proposition 
submitted to a vote of the people, may be con-
tested: ... (4) When illegal votes have been 
received, or legal votes have been rejected, at 
the polls sufficient to change the result." 
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The net result of advertising an election as per-
mitting all electors to vote and instructing the judges 
that all electors may vote in the event that this court 
decides that electors means tax paying electors is that 
some votes, but not all votes, would be invalid. This 
question was not discussed in the opinion of the court 
on the Provo election. However, this proposition 
may be very simply applied. By way of illustration, 
the Board of Education of Salt Lake City held 
p. leeway election in 1962 which was combined 
with a bond election. All electors were permitted to 
vote at the leeway election, but only those who had 
paid a property tax were permitted to vote on the 
bond election. The names of all persons voting on 
each question are a matter of record and have been 
preserved. There was a total of 10,600 votes on the 
bond election and a total of 10,815 votes on the 
leeway election. There were, therefore, only 215 
more votes cast on the leeway election than on the 
bond election. The leeway election carried 8,413 in 
favor and 2,402 against. The bond election carried 
8,421 in favor and 2,179 against. Prima facie, and 
assuming that only tax payers should have voted, 
there were only 215 illegal votes cast while the 
proposition carried by a majority of 6,011. 
The foregoing figures assume that all those voting 
on the bond election also voted on the leeway elec-
tion. With such a similarly overwhelming vote, it 
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would SC'C'ffi that this is a safe assumption to make. 
However, should one not care to indulge in the pre-
surnption, the records are available to show the 
names of all of the persons who were issued ballots 
and who voted in each election. It could, therefore, 
be demonstrated whether or not there were more 
than 215 supposedly ineligible votes cast in the 
leeway election. 
The following cases support the general rule that 
an election should not be declared invalid unless it 
appears that there were enough illegal votes cast to 
change the result of the election. 
The case of Buckhouse v. Joint School Dist. No. 28, 
85 Mont. 141, 277 Pac. 961 ( 1929) dealt with a situ-
ation in which an election involving a school levy 
was attacked on the basis that those who voted in 
favor of the levy did not appear on the assessment 
roles and did not pay taxes on real estate for that 
year. The court in reply to this contention said: 
"In the view we take of the case it is unnec-
essary to determine whether the 1927 or 1928 
assessment role was the proper guide in deter-
mining the qualifications of the voters." 
The court took the position that this was so because: 
"As before stated, there is no evidence in this 
case showing how the illegal votes were cast 
and no evidence showing that it was impossible 
to make this proof. The rule applicable here 
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was applied by this court in the case of Atkin-
son v. Roosevelt County, supra, where it is 
said: 'The burden not only rested upon the 
plaintiff to prove illegal votes cast, but to show 
how they were cast, for if the latter showing is 
not made by the evidence, how is the court to 
know what deductions to make from the votes 
cast? ... It was incumbent on the plaintiff to 
show by a preponderance of the evidence the 
number of illegal votes received by Wolf Point 
in each precinct in which illegal voting was 
charged, and that number must be sufficient, 
if rejected, to change the result. Where the 
ballots cast by illegal voters are capable of 
identification or where satisfactory proof is 
given as to how the votes were cast, proper 
deductions should be made by the court so as 
to determine the correct result. But where 
votes are shown to have been cast illegally in a 
given precinct, neither the entire election nor 
that of a precinct should be annulled, if it may 
he by the court avoided under the facts. Each 
case, however, must be determined upon its 
own peculiar facts. The election must be 
sustained unless votes cast for a candidate are 
found to be illegal in number sufficient to 
change the final result.'" 
In the Buckhouse case the judgment in favor of the 
defendant school district and the county officials was 
upheld. 
The following statement is taken from the case 
of Reitveld v. Northern Wyoming Community Col. 
Dist., Wyoming, 344 P. 2d 986 (1959): 
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''. . . an election is not to be set aside for 
mere informalities or irregularities unless they 
are shown to have affected the result of the 
election." 
They also had said: 
"Every reasonable presumption will be in-
dulged in favor of the validity of an election 
which has been held, and the one asserting 
that the election is irregular must bear the 
burden of showing that it is otherwise." 
Furthermore, a completed election cannot be in-
validated without showing that sufficient improper 
votes were cast to change the result and that the 
improper votes cast, if rejected, would, in fact, have 
changed the result. 
The general statement of position is contained in 
29 C.J.S., Elections, Section 274, Page 394, 
"Where an election is contested on the ground 
of illegal voting, the contestant has the burden 
of showing that sufficient illegal votes were 
cast to change the result, and of showing for 
whom or for what they were cast." 
In 1928 the Oklahoma courts in the case of 
In re Incorporation of Town of Big Cabin, 132 Okla. 
200~ 270 Pac. 75 ( 1928) stated: 
""And where the [in]validity (sic) of elections 
is alleged on account of illegal voting, those 
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seeking to set aside the result, as declared by 
the election officials, have the burden of proof, 
not only that illegal votes were cast in sufficient 
number to change the result, but must show 
by whom and for whom or for what issue such 
votes were cast." 
In 1949 the Maryland court in the case of Wilkin-
son v. McGill, 192 Maryland 387, 64 A. 2d 266 
(1949) stated: 
"The question is by no means free from diffi-
culty, but we think the weight of authority 
and the better reasoning uphold the view that 
complainants, desiring to avoid an election 
because illegal votes are cast, have upon them 
the burden of proving for whom these votes 
are cast. They cannot thrust that burden upon 
the Court by arguing that there is a probability 
that such votes were cast for the side havin. 
the majority. They must prove, or at lee. 
attempt to prove, how the illegal voters vote• 
If direct proof cannot be obtained from thf 
illegal voters themselves, other evidence of a 
circumstantial nature may be offered. In any 
event, there must be an effort to produce this 
proof. If an effort is made, which proves futile, 
and there is no way of producing proper evi · 
dence, it may be that the safest procedure is 
to throw out the election, but we have not 
that situation before us. As we have already 
said, the appellees in this case made no effort, 
either to prove how the illegal voters cast their 
ballots, nor to offer any explanation of their 
failure to do so. They did not state that such 
evidence was impossible for them to obtain. 
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Under these circumstances, we must conclude 
that they have failed to meet the burden 
imposed upon them, and that the election 
must stand." 
In 1961, the Nebraska court in Arends v. Whitten, 
172 Neb. 297, 109 N.W. 2d 363 ( 1961) stated: 
1: 
· "The answer of school district No. 39 was 
exactly the same as that of school district No. 
88, except that it contained an additional alle-
gation that certain persons voted at the said 
purported election who did not meet the qual-
ifications required of an elector to vote at a 
school election. While evidence was intro-
duced on this point, there is no specific assign-
ment of error. In any event, we quote the 
following from Mehrens v. Election Canvassing 
Board, 134 Neb. 151, 278 N.W. 252: 'In an 
election contest on the ground that, through 
"ignorance and mistake" of election officers, 
enough illegal votes were cast in a voting pre-
cinct to change the result of the election, the 
burden is on contestant to prove the casting 
of the illegal votes and also the candidates for 
whom they were cast.' This is a sufficient 
answer, because no attempt was made to show 
how the alleged unqualified voters actually 
voted.'' 
See also the cases of Wadsworth v. Neher, 138 
Okl. +, 280 Pac. 263 ( 1929); Rosenbrock v. School 
District iVo. 3, 344 Mich. 335, 74 N.W. 2d 32 (1955); 
Thompson v. Cihak, 254 Mich. 641, 236 N.W. 893 
( 1931); l\1iller v. Miller, 266 Mich. 127, 253 N.W. 
241 ( 1934). 
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PorNT 3 
THE FORM OF NOTICE OF ELECTION AND 
PROPOSITION VOTED UPON WERE SUF-
FICIENT. 
The notice of the election in the Provo School 
District was as follows: 
"Shall the Board of Education of Provo 
City, State of Utah, be authorized to maintain 
a 'voted leeway' program as provided in Sec-
tion 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961, not 
to exceed ten percent ( 10%) of the minimum 
basic program provided by law." 
The argument of the appellant on this point 
stressed particularly the form of the notice provided 
for in Section 53-10-3 Utah Code Annotated ( 1953), 
quoting subdivisions 1 through 4. Appellant empha-
sizes subparagraph (4) of Section 53-10-3 as a statu-
tory provision not complied with in the notice. (See 
page 15 of appellant's brief.) The brief there empha-
sizes by italics that the Notice should contain: 
"(4) The amount of indebtedness which the 
board proposes to incur or create and for what 
purpose.'' 
Of course, there. is no indebtedness created by 
a leeway election and there was, therefore, no 
necessity for complying with said subdivision ( 4) 
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of paragraph 53-10-3. Appellant goes on to say on 
page 16 that "the notice skillfully avoids any mention 
of a tax levy necessary to support the program." 
There is no necessity for mentioning a tax levy 
when voting on the proposition set forth in the lee-
way election statute. 
This court without following the argument of 
appellant with respect to the invalidity of the notice 
stated that it was invalid because there was a 
reference to the "minimum basic program" instead 
of the "basic" school program as defined by Section 
53-7-16 (b). The notice did, however, expressly refer 
to "a 'voted leeway' program as provided in Section 
11, Chapter 104, the Laws of Utah, 1961." 
It seems to us that a reference to the statute pro-
viding for the leeway program and actually giving 
the specific section is a sufficient notice. 
In the case of Kent v. School Dist. No. 28, 106 
Okla. 30, 233 Pac. 431 ( 1925) the opinion said: 
"It is next contended that there was no statu-
tory notice of the calling of the election as 
required by law. It is not claimed that notice 
was not given, but that the notice did not 
strictly conform to the requirements of the 
statute in defining the qualifications of the 
electors entitled to vote at such election. The 
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notice which was posted was introduced in 
evidence by plaintiffs and shows it to be the 
official form furnished for that purpose by the 
state superintendent. No effort was made and 
no tender of proof was offered to show that 
any person qualified to vote at the election 
failed to do so by by (sic) reason of being mis-
led or misinformed as to his rights to vote by 
the language of the notice. In McCarty et al. 
v. Cain et al., 27 Okl. 82, 110 P. 653, this court 
announced the rule that: 
'Where a special election is assailed on 
the ground of lack of compliance with all 
of the statutory requirements in reference 
to notice, but there is no averment or 
showing that the electors did not have 
actual notice or know ledge of the election 
and failed to participate therein by reason 
thereof, the same will not be held void 
on this account.' 
''This rule has been approved and followed 
in Ratliff et al v. State ex rei, 70 Okl. 152, 191 
P. 1038; Lowe v. Consolidated District No. 97, 
79 Okl. 115, 191 P.737; State ex rei v. Sullivan 
et al., 80 Okl. 81, 194 P. 446; Smith et al. v. 
State ex rei., 84 Okl. 283, 203 P. 1046. No 
distinction in principle exists between the 
instant case and those above cited. In the 
instant case the reason for the rule, in view of 
the objections to the notice, is somewhat 
strengthened by the legal presumption that 
all voters know the law, including that fixing 
the qualifications of voters in school district 
elections." 
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l t is hard to imagine that the electorate was 
influenced by the form of the notice. Usually the 
effect of an affirmative vote on an election is well 
publicized and voters are more influenced by the 
publicity and explanation of those who are for or 
against the program than by the form of the notice 
or ballot. We, of course, do not mean that the ballot 
may take any form. For those who wished to deter-
mine of their own knowledge what they were voting 
for, there was a reference to the precise section of 
the statute wherein the leeway election is provided 
for, and that section answers any question in the 
mind of an informed voter. It informs him of the 
precise question voted upon. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully request this court to grant a 
rehearing in this case. Whether or not the ultimate 
decision of this court is to reverse or sustain the trial 
court, we request a clarification of the opinion of 
December 31, 1962, on all of the points herein stated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
PAUL B. CANNON 
STEPHEN A. WEST 
Attorneys for Board of Education of 
Salt Lake City 
SAMUEL C. POWELL 
Attorney for Board of Education of 
Ogden City 
RICHARD C. HOWE 
Attorney for Board of Education of 
Murray City 
McKAY AND BURTON 
DAVID L. McKAY 
Attorney for Board of Education of 
Granite School District 
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